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In our Western societies we are living in a period in which we are 
confronted with the costs and limits of the following: economic 
planning and growth, the expanded state system of social policy, and 
expansion in the formal educational system. In this situation the search 
for quality instead of quantity, the search for private and grass-roots, 
instead of state, initiative, and the search for informal instead of 
formal settings for education and learning seem to be growing in 
importance. There is a widespread awareness that we have, by means 
of quantitative growth and expansion, created structures of economy, 
policy and education that have been shown to be unable to satisfy basic 
human needs, needs as reflected, for example, in the well-known 
hierarchy of Maslow. In this context of a change of conditions and 
attitudes, certain topics - partly new; partly old - seem to gain a new 
priority in policy. One example of a new topic of this sort is 
environmental policy and education, and one example of the new 
priority of an old topic is family policy and education. 
The family is, on the one hand, not to be seen as an element of the 
educational system; what happens in families, by their very nature, 
cannot be planned or controlled by means of curricula, professional 
standards or examinations. Education in the family is not the object of 
direct public policy in the same sense as education in schools. On the 
other hand, the family has to be seen as the basic institution of society. 
It plays the decisive role not only in the physical reproduction of 
population but also in socialisation and education. In fulfilling these 
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functions the family depends on objective socio-economic conditions 
as well as on such individual conditions as one's knowledge and 
attitudes. Education in the family can thus become the object of public 
policy, in the sense of an indirect policy that tries to influence the 
aforementioned objective and individual conditions under which the 
family functions. 
These notions are necessary in order to understand why family 
policy and educational policy have developed as different and separate 
fields of action. However, these two areas of public policy are 
connected by a common goal, namely, the support and shaping of the 
young, growing-up generation. Speaking about children, we can state 
that childhood in modern societies reflects a bipolar existence: there is 
family childhood, on the one hand, and school childhood, on the 
other. It is one of the problems of modern education that these two 
worlds of childhood tend to become more and more separated, the one 
being defined as the stronghold of privacy and the centre of everyday 
life, the other being shaped as an artificial and formalised setting for 
learning. One could say, therefore, that educational policy and family 
policy represent strategies for the reintegration of these two worlds of 
childhood. Educational policy would try, then, to bring back the 
elements of everyday life to the school, and family policy to bring the 
family nearer to public life. To look at the same thing from another 
perspective, one can say that educational policy and the educational 
system could contribute to the improvement of knowledge and 
attitudes as factors conditioning education in the family, whereas 
family policy, by improving the objective conditions of family life, 
could add to the ability to profit from the learning process within the 
formal educational system. 
We can add to this that education, seen in a historical perspective, 
has tended to become more and more professionalised, in the sense 
that interaction with children has had to be increasingly guided 
by knowledge and competence. This tendency towards 
professionalisation has thus extended from public education to the 
field of family education. There are attempts to develop strategies of 
parent training similar to strategies of teacher training. For example, 
the German authorities launched a project in the 1970s under the title 
E l t e r n f u h r e r s c h e i n (driving licence for parents), and the Soviet 
authorities developed a so-called p r o g r a m m a - m i n i m u m for parent 
education in the 1960s (Liegle, p. 72). We can state, therefore, that 
educational policy and family policy, being established as separate 
fields of action in the modern welfare state, are interconnected not 
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only in respect of common goals but also, at least partly, by similar 
strategies of action. 
F A M I L Y P O L I C Y A S A R E A C T I O N T O S O C I A L 
P R O B L E M S A N D I N D I V I D U A L N E E D S 
Referring, in this respect, to the Soviet Union , we can state that there, 
as in Western countries, family policy is a well-established field of 
action. We have to ask, however, whether, within this field, changes 
have occurred in the last decades and whether further changes can be 
foreseen in the 1980s. In order to answer this question we should 
distinguish between family policy as an a c t i v e strategy, which tries to 
shape the social reality of the family in a predefined direction, and 
family policy as a r e a c t i v e strategy, which tries to react to those social 
problems and to influence those objective and individual conditions of 
family life and education that work against the predefined goal. In the 
first case, referring to active family policy, I would assume that major 
changes did not, and wil l not, occur in the Soviet Union: the goal, 
generally speaking, to establish an effective family group as a loyal cell 
of the socialist society, has been essentially the same since the 1936 
laws for the stabilisation of marriage and the family and will be 
essentially the same in the 1980s. In the second case, however, 
referring to family policy as a reactive strategy, I want to demonstrate 
the occurrence of certain changes that characterise the transition from 
the 1970s to the 1980s and that can be interpreted as reactions (new 
reactions in part) to changing social problems and to the changing 
objective and individual conditions of family life. I will discuss Soviet 
family policy mainly in this sense of a reactive strategy. 
Let me begin with the changing social problems and the changing 
conditions of family life to which policy reacts. One of these problems 
has been already mentioned in my introductory remarks, namely the 
costs and limits of economic growth. More evidence of such general 
social problems is to be found in the recent Soviet literature on the 
family. For example, Kharchev, the leading figure in this field, has 
worked out the following characteristics of the present stage of 
development of society: 
. . . on the one hand more will be demanded from the people and, 
consequently, from their education, and on the other, we will have 
to face growing complexities of the conditions of education in 
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connection with the growth of big cities, the mass migration of 
population, the increase in the volume of information and other 
consequences of the scientific-technical revolution (Sem'ya i 
obshchestvo, p. 18). 
These are very global notions, whose relevance to family and family 
policy seems not to be directly self-evident. 
A more differentiated answer can be given to the question of the 
past and anticipated future changes in family education and policy if 
this question is directed towards the relevant conditions of parent-
child interaction and towards the changing position of children in the 
social world of today. Many of the authors in the field of family 
research have devoted parts of their interpretations of empirical data 
to this question, and we can find here similar evidence, generally 
speaking, concerning the developments in the post-industrial 
societies, including our own. 
To cite Kharchev again: 
Nowadays, the child develops much faster than some decades ago, 
because it is daily confronted by direct communication and by 
television and radio with so much information as in earlier times 
over months or years. Consequently there is less time for inner 
concentration, less possibility for the development of phantasy and 
imagination . . . 
. . . Urbanization, which destroys the directness and regularity of 
man's contact with nature, claims additional measures from society, 
in order to compensate for this loss . . . 
. . . Life in the cities makes the out-of-home and out-of-school 
behaviour of children today, more than ever before, independent of 
the direct control of grown-ups . . . (Sem'ya i obshchestvo, p. 18). 
We can add to this numerous factors of stress within everyday life, 
discussed in Soviet literature, as, for example: the high density and 
scarcity of living quarters; the lack of time for parent-child interaction 
inside the family because of the out-of-home work of both parents; the 
heavy burden of household duties and shopping; the stress of learning 
within and outside the school; and the general rise in the standards of 
living, connected with the rise of materialistic orientation and a loss of 
social contacts. The development in the conditions of family life and 
education can be perceived as a change in what Urie Bronfenbrenner 
calls the ecology of human development. 
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There are manifold phenomena of the crisis in family life and 
education, which can be, and are, interpreted as indirect, and direct, 
consequences of the abovementioned changes in the ecology of human 
development by Soviet experts. For example, one out of three 
marriages ends in divorce (cf. Bodalev); families tend to be childless or 
to have only one child (Sem'ya s e v o d n i y a , p. 114); a growing number 
of grown-ups and youths react to the stress factors of a more and more 
complicated world by alcoholism, neurosis and other forms of what is 
called deviant behaviour. In this context, public policy towards the 
family today is an instrument designed to diminish the negative 
consequences of scientific-technical development, economic growth 
and social change, i.e. an instrument of crisis management whose 
positive purpose it is to improve the living conditions and ecology of 
families and children. 
We have argued so far that family policy reacts to social change and 
problems. We should ask, in concluding this section, why it is the 
family that gets priority in political action and not, for example, the 
school or the sphere of work. One argument, proposed by Kharchev 
(and other Soviet authors), is that the family represents 'not simply a 
most important, but a necessary and quite specific, component in the 
socialisation of children' (Sem'ya i obshchestvo, p. 18), and that this is 
especially true under the conditions of a changing and increasingly 
complex world. 
This would mean, firstly, that society has to rely on the family as the 
basic institution of socialisation and, this being so, that support for the 
family is of public interest. This would mean, secondly, that the family 
is perceived by the people themselves as the centre of their lives, as the 
main factor in self-realisation and education. Relating to this second 
aspect, Kharchev cites two recent investigations into which social 
factor is seen as having the most important influence on education. 
The answer of 959 respondents - managers of industrial and 
agricultural enterprises - showed the following order of social factors: 
(1) family, (2) school, (3) mass communication, (4) social 
organisations and work collectives, (5) comrades and friends, (6) 
self-education, and (7) literature and the arts. A similar preference for 
the family over other social factors was found in a questionnaire whose 
respondents were 1669 university students and pupils in 'tekhnikumy' 
(Sem'ya i obshchestvo, p. 17). There is additional evidence from 
investigations into the hierarchy of values in the young generation that 
here, too, the family ranks first, with 'peace' being the second in the 
hierarchy. This being so, support for the family by means of public 
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policy seems to be an apt response not only to public interests but to 
individual needs, preferences and values as well. 
T H E S O V I E T M O D E L O F F A M I L Y P O L I C Y 
My second point relates to the question of which model of family policy 
is used in the Soviet Union in order to facilitate solutions to the social 
problems mentioned above, and whether this model has undergone 
changes in recent times. A n y model of family policy has to be analysed 
in at least three dimensions: (1) the dimension of aims, (2) the 
dimension of instrumental means, and (3) the dimension of actors. 
Referring to the aims of family policy, I would like to repeat my 
notion that, in this dimension, one finds a rather strong continuity in 
Soviet policies since 1936, as well as a rather obvious similarity of 
Soviet policy to family policies in Western countries, namely, the 
stabilisation of marriage and the family, and support for the care and 
education of children within and outside the family. There is, in my 
view, only one point in the dimension of aims that is worth mentioning 
in respect of change: since the 1970s the Soviet authorities claim 
more outspokenly than in the past the improvement of demographic 
development to be the main aim of family policy. This old-new trend is 
a very clear example of the abovementioned fact that family policy has 
to be seen as a reaction to social problems, the social problem being 
defined here by the unsatisfactory demographic development of Soviet 
society. The interconnection of family policy and population 
development is a well-known phenomenon, not only in the Soviet 
Union, and I will come back to this later. 
Of more interest is the second dimension: the policies towards the 
family and children. Here we have to identify, roughly speaking, two 
strategies, income strategy and service strategy. The first is meant to 
improve the material situation of spouses, of parents and children and 
of the whole family system by direct and indirect payments. It 
comprises measures like credits for young couples, leave of absence 
from work for pregnant women and young mothers, child allowances, 
tax reductions for families with several children, housing programmes 
and so forth. The second type of strategy is meant to improve and to 
complete the functions of the family - mainly household and child care 
- by the establishment of a network of social services. It comprises 
measures like public eating-houses, health services, day-care 
institutions, schools with a prolonged day, counselling services and so 
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forth. It has been, and continues to be, characteristic for family policy, 
not only in the Soviet Union but also elsewhere, that both these 
strategies are used at the same time. However, there are different 
orientations to be found within the income and the service strategy as 
well as in the way both are combined. It is my impression that Soviet 
family policy is at present undergoing a remarkable change in respect 
of such orientations, a change whose consequences will become clear 
only during the 1980s. 
The combination of income and service strategies in Soviet family 
policy has until recently shown the following features: income 
strategies have concentrated on direct payments, whereas service 
strategies have concentrated on the expansion of institutional child 
care and education. Meanwhile, there have been signs of new 
orientations. Within the income strategy, mothers' leave of absence 
from work and, thereby, the time for mother-child interaction, has 
been remarkably expanded. Within the service strategy, support 
systems for mothers and children such as prevention, counselling and 
education, get similar attention to the expansion of institutional care 
and education. Both developments point, in my view, to the same 
direction and tendency, namely, to a higher evaluation of the family as 
a socialising and educative agent - in other words, to a support system 
that is meant to improve the conditions of parent-child interaction and 
child care i n s i d e the family. I would like to come back to this tendency 
in the concluding section. At this point I want only to speculate that 
this new type of family policy has been chosen by Soviet authorities on 
the assumption that it will prove an adequate means for reaching the 
main aim of the present family policy: to motivate women to have 
more children. 
Before I continue with the demographic aspect of family policy, I 
have to describe the third dimension of the actors in family policy. This 
can be done in a few words. In contrast to the traditions in Western 
societies, the whole spectrum of support systems in Soviet family 
policy is managed by public organisations and agencies and controlled 
by administrative or Party authorities. Considering the costs of 
bureaucratisation, as, for example, in educational policy and in the 
educational system, one can speculate that such a model is apt to create 
certain problems for those who are the consumers of these services. 
This is the well-known problem of public social services - that support 
is always connected with social control. 
So far, I have tried to characterise the Soviet model of family policy, 
its changes through time and its common and different traits in 
64 E d u c a t i o n i n t h e F a m i l y a n d F a m i l y P o l i c y 
comparison with other models. For this purpose I have introduced the 
three dimensions. Clearly, this can only be an analytical distinction. 
Therefore, in the following and in the concluding section, I will try to 
give a more integrative view of the aims and instruments of Soviet 
policies towards the family and children, concentrating here on some 
of the abovementioned new tendencies. 
N E W T R E N D S I N S O V I E T F A M I L Y P O L I C Y 
A positive Demographic Policy 
Starting with the demographic aspect, we can state that the aim of 
raising the birth rate became paramount in Soviet policy, as in family 
policies elsewhere, in the 1970s. It has been mentioned already that the 
new element is not this aim in itself but its outspokenness. Brezhnev, in 
his introductory speech at the 26th Party Congress, ascribed 'serious 
attention to the elaboration and realization of an effective 
demographic policy, to the problems of population development, 
which sharpened in recent times' ( M a t e r i a l y , p. 54). A s the most 
important means for the solution of these problems, Brezhnev pointed 
to the strengthening of support for the family, young couples and, 
mainly, for women. He continued with the argument that, in this field, 
broader and more effective measures were necessary, the following 
measures being of special relevance: 
1 The introduction of partly paid leave from work for child care during 
the first year of life and of part-time work for mothers with young 
children. 
2 The expansion and improvement of pre-school institutions, of 
schools with a prolonged day and of household services. 
3 The raising of child allowances, mainly in connection with the birth 
of a second or third child. 
Already some time before the opening of the 26th Party Congress, a 
Decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers was 
published which described the details of future demographic and 
family policies. I would like to come back to this document in my last 
section. At this point, let me turn to the local level as an illustrative 
example of a family policy aimed at raising the birth rate. It is well 
known that demographic problems are concentrated in the European 
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parts of the Soviet Union and mainly in the big cities. Moscow, with its 
8 million inhabitants, has the lowest birth rate of the whole Soviet 
Union . Relevant research has shown that 81 per cent of families have 
either no or only one child and that the average number of wanted 
children is 1.8. There is no natural reproduction of the Moscow 
population, the growth of which is due only to migration (Sem'ya 
s e v o d n i y a , p. 14). Reacting to this, Moscow Party and administrative 
authorities launched a 'Plan of measures for the improvement of the 
demographic situation and for stimulation of natural population 
growth of Moscow city' in September 1977. It is interesting to look 
briefly at the strategies and the character of the measures proposed by 
this plan for local family policy. The plan comprises four sections. The 
first section deals with the improvement of housing conditions for 
young families. It is said that a separate living place has to be seen as 
one of the most important preconditions for the establishment and 
development of a modern family. Some relevant measures giving 
young couples the right to an apartment are proposed. This clear 
prominence of the measures, which relate to the ecological dimension 
of family life and family education, is a relatively new phenomenon in 
Soviet family policy. It has to be seen as a reaction to the research 
evidence, which points to a positive correlation between marriage 
stability and the birth rate on the one side and the quality of housing on 
the other. 
The second section of the plan deals with the expansion and 
improvement of institutions of pre-school education and other services 
for families and children. Here we find the continuation of a traditional 
strategy of Soviet educational and family policy, namely, a service 
strategy aiming at facilitating women's and mothers' productive work 
by freeing them from some of the child care and household duties by 
means of the establishment of public services. A new element within 
this strategy can be found in the Moscow plan, in that it proposes to 
establish experimentally two to three so-called 'house-rooms' for 
children in each city sector of Moscow, so that special services for 
family child care (e.g. the supply of milk and other baby-food) can be 
supplied. 
The third section of the plan can be seen as a further specification of 
the second one, in so far as it deals with the expansion and 
improvement of public health services. 
Of more interest is the last section of the plan, which proposes a 
whole set of measures for what is called educational propaganda in the 
population, relating to problems of sociology and demography, to 
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programmes for hygiene and sex education and to courses about the 
Soviet family and its juridical and moral foundations. We can see here 
that within family policy instruments of a non-economic, educational 
nature get increasing attention. 
Support systems for Education within the Family and towards the 
Family 
In this section, let me turn to a second new tendency in Soviet family 
policy, the consequences of which will become clear only during the 
1980s. It can be characterised as follows. The aim of support and 
stabilisation of the family system is secured not by an income but by a 
service strategy, which uses the instrument of counselling instead of 
institutionalised education outside the family, and is directed towards 
the parents instead of the children. 
Obviously, this approach is not new in itself. Starting with 
Makarenko's B o o k f o r P a r e n t s and up to the abovementioned 
P r o g r a m m a - m i n i m u m f o r P a r e n t E d u c a t i o n f o r t h e F o l k U n i v e r s i t i e s , 
there have been different activities in this field. The new phenomenon 
is the status of this approach within the whole field of family policy and 
the new orientation towards psychological/psychiatric methods, which 
had been taboo since the 1936 'Pedology' document under Stalin. 
Fundamental to this new and newly stressed approach is the 
different diagnosis of family deficits in the socialist society. A. A. 
Bodalev, one of the leading psychologists, has stressed that whereas in 
earlier times the term 'neblagopoluchnaya sem'ya' was associated 
mainly with the material situation, 'now another factor becomes 
prominent: the instability of relations within the family, the conflicts 
between father and mother. Now attention is paid to the emotional 
climate in the family which is detrimental for the child' (Kussmann, 
p. 8). 
The largest chapter of a booklet entitled F a m i l y a n d Society, which 
appeared in 1982, is on 'Social-therapeutic activity in the field of 
marriage and family relations'. One argument in favour of this new 
orientation, presented in the first paragraph, is that changes in the 
family structure and relations, such as the strengthening of equality 
and equal rights of the sexes, lead to a situation in which conflicts can 
no longer be solved by traditional means, namely, formal authority, 
but only by the development of new ways of bargaining. A second 
argument is that the need for psychological support of the individual 
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has grown under the stress-inducing conditions of the scientific-
technical revolution, and that in this context especially the family 
acquires an ever more important meaning. On the basis of these two 
arguments, the growing necessity for the establishment of counselling 
and therapeutic services is put forward: 
In the scientific literature of the last years the question of the 
necessity to establish in our country support services for the family 
has been judged unanimously. This is convincingly shown by the 
experiences of consulting agencies and cabinets for problems of 
family life which were collected in the last years. Unt i l recently, the 
majority of these agencies had the character of social experiments 
. . . Meanwhile, the experts are confronted with the task of 
analysing and generalising experience which has been gathered in 
our country and in other socialist countries, as well as critically 
evaluating the experience of family therapy, which has been 
developed in capitalist countries. The aim is to establish 
organizational settings of family services which are optimal under 
the conditions prevalent in our socialist countries (Sem'ya i 
obshchestvo, p. 100). 
The main sections of the article, a resume of which is given here, refer 
to the different types of counselling and family therapy that are to be 
found, mainly in American literature. It is astonishing, by the way, to 
observe that the evaluation of foreign experience in this field is 
concentrated on Western countries, in spite of the fact that the 
German Democratic Republic, for example, has developed quite a 
reputation in the field of counselling and therapy. One gets the 
impression that Soviet authorities orientate their policy, as, for 
instance, in the field of socialisation theory, in the field of behavioural 
and social science at large and in the field of science generally, 
according to the most developed standards to be found. In this respect, 
the introduction of concepts and strategies developed in Western 
countries (mainly the U S A ) is striking, even if one considers the 
critical notes that accompany this process of adaptation. Only in the 
last paragraphs of the cited article do the authors come back to 
experiences gathered in the Soviet Union, and here they refer mainly 
to the tradition (since 1962) of family counselling in the Latvian SSR, 
where the emphasis is on the preparation of youth for marriage and 
family life by special courses for tenth-graders in secondary schools. 
This model of, so to speak, anticipatory counselling and education is 
68 E d u c a t i o n i n t h e F a m i l y a n d F a m i l y P o l i c y 
judged as a very important and successful instrument for mediating 
what is called 'psikhologicheskaya gramotnost' of future spouses and 
parents, for the stabilisation of marriage and family. The article ends 
with the following statements: 
Giving therapeutic help to the family must be seen as a most 
important and fundamental component of a family support service. 
It must be exercised at all stages of the life cycle of the family and 
include manifold working methods, patterns and approaches. It is 
the function of family therapy to give universal help to the family, so 
that the family can successfully fulfil its numerous functions, 
guarantee the physical and psychic health of all its members and 
pave the way to a harmonic development of the personalities of the 
spouses and their children (Sem'ya i obshchestvo, p. 120). 
If this tendency to establish consulting-therapeutic services for the 
family is pursued, I would not hesitate to interpret it as one of the 
symptoms of a turning point and a new pattern of Marxist thinking on 
man, on human nature and on personality development. This 
tendency expresses no less than the conviction that the self-realisation 
of man cannot be defined in terms of macro-sociological and economic 
categories, in terms of participation in society and mainly in the sphere 
of work. On the contrary, society and the work sphere, as moulded by 
the progress of the scientific-technical revolution, are more and more 
perceived in terms of their ambivalent consequences for self-
realisation. Instead, the micro-social networks and relations, the 
interpersonal conditions and determinants as the basis of self-
realisation, are stressed. It is not only the good (socialist) society which 
leads to satisfying human relations; human relations and mental health 
become aims in themselves, which have to be furthered by public 
support systems, not of an economic nature, but of an educative, 
consulting, therapeutic and ecological nature. 
This statement sounds rather overdone. Let me, therefore, apart 
from philosophical speculations, come to some representative 
examples of action within the political system which can show that, 
with the beginning of the 1980s, Soviet policies towards the family have 
included new stresses in line with what I have tried to derive from the 
literature so far. 
There is, first, the foundation of an A l l Union Guidance Council 
Centre within the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the U S S R in 
1980. (The establishment of this Centre is to be seen in the context of 
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recommendations made both by the Presidium of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR and by the Research Institute for Psychology in 
the A P N in 1978. The first referred to the establishment of public 
psychological services generally; the second put forward a proposal to 
set up a 'clinic' for psychological diagnosis and counselling, in which 
the professional profile of the 'counselling psychologist' could also be 
developed.) 
The newly found Centre is intended to combine empirical research 
and practical counselling. As far as practical counselling in the field of 
marriage and family problems is concerned, one can find prototypes of 
such a Centre in the Latvian SSR and Leningrad, although they are 
mainly to be found in other socialist countries - 200 in the German 
Democratic Republic, forty-seven in Czechoslovakia, and thirty in 
Poland (Kussmann, p. 21). 
Referring to the Leningrad experience, A. G. Kharchev, the leading 
figure in Soviet family research, stated in his book M a r r i a g e a n d t h e 
F a m i l y i n t h e USSR i n 1979: 
. . . It is not by chance that the questions of adaptation of young 
people to the conditions of family life become more and more 
important in scientific research work, as well as in practice . . . 
Regarding situations connected with the infringement of moral 
norms in the family, it is evidently necessary to exercise particular 
caution and consideration, not only in respect of the possible 
positive, but also of the possible negative consequences of 
intervention. Most appropriate to all these demands is a system of 
individualised consultations of psychologists and sexologists. This 
system must rest upon territorial counselling centres and at the same 
time be placed in a certain cooperative relationship with 
psychological services in enterprises (Kharchev, 1979, pp. 202-3). 
My first example, the establishment of the first A l l Union Guidance 
Council Centre in Moscow, and the comments on it made by Kharchev 
and Bodalev, point to the following facts: 
1 This Centre can be seen as a basis and official starting point for the 
introduction of a new family support system in the Soviet Union. 
2 The future development of this support system seems to be 
characterised by the aim of establishing a growing number of 
decentralised services. 
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3 The concept and approach of counselling points to the conviction 
that family policy should act not only on the macro-system level but 
also on the levels of the meso- and micro-system. 
4 This support system does not rely primarily on economic and 
political measures of intervention but on educative, counselling and 
therapeutic measures. 
A second example of the new orientation of Soviet policies towards 
the family is the whole package of measures laid down in a Decree of 
the Central Committee of the C P S U and the Council of Ministers of 
the U S S R on 22 January 1981 under the title 'On measures for 
strengthening governmental aid to families with children'. The 
majority of these measures is consistent with the tradition of Soviet 
family policy since 1936 and refers to the improvement of the economic 
and ecological conditions of family life (child allowances, other 
payments and credits in connection with childbirth, housing 
programmes, especially for young families, etc.) and to the expansion 
of child care and health services (cribs, kindergartens, prolonged 
school-days, prophylactic and counselling agencies for pregnant 
women, etc.). There are two groups of measures, however, which 
seem to signalise new trends in Soviet family policy. 
One is what the Decree calls measures with the aim of creating more 
favourable possibilities for maternal care for newly born and young 
children'. The Soviet government adapts, under this title, the example 
of other communist states in conceding paid leave from work for 
mothers for the care of a child up to the end of the first year of life; 
further unpaid leave, connected with a guarantee for keeping the prior 
job assignment, is recommended for six months, and, in the future, for 
the whole second year of the life of a child. Additional measures are 
the expansion of part-time work for women with children and an 
additional three days' paid leave for women with two or more children 
under the age of twelve. (It is interesting to note, by the way, that in a 
country where equality of the sexes is one of the prominent aims, the 
expansion of time for child care within the family is exclusively defined 
within the context of female rights and duties.) 
The other group is what the Decree calls measures 'in the field of 
improving propaganda and educational work'. The aims mentioned 
here are to expand knowledge about the family 'as one of the highest 
moral values in socialist society, to give more attention to the 
strengthening of the prestige of motherhood and to the stabilisation of 
marriage and family relations and to create an atmosphere of higher 
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care and respect for families with children'. As instruments for 
realising these aims, the government recommends the introduction of 
obligatory lessons on the psychology and ethics of family life and 
hygiene and sex education for boys and girls into the curricula of higher 
classes of the general and professional educational system. In addition, 
the Komsomol is invited to improve its work with young people in the 
fields of the propagation of a socialist life-style, of the development 
of feelings of responsibility towards family and society, and the 
development of respectful relations with girls, women, mothers and 
the aged. 
These measures, announced in a Decree that has to be seen in the 
context of the 26th Congress of the C P S U , points to the following 
conclusions: 
1 Soviet family policy in the 1980s shows a new tendency of shortening 
the work time of women in favour of time that can be used for family 
tasks. Of special interest here is the paid leave from work during the 
first year of life of a child. In virtue of this measure child care within 
the family gets a new public prestige and an additional incentive for 
parenthood is striven for. 
2 Soviet family policy in the 1980s strengthens the tendency to add to 
the traditional economic instruments a group of instruments of an 
educative nature. Of special interest here is the introduction and 
improvement of anticipatory parent education in schools and youth 
organisations. By this it is made clear that the quality of marriage 
and family relations and the quality of education in the family are 
not only dependent on macro-system conditions but also on factors 
like knowledge and attitudes. 
F A M I L Y P O L I C Y A N D S O C I A L C O N T R O L -
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D P E R S P E C T I V E S 
If one looks back to what I have called new trends in Soviet family 
policy in the 1980s, one gets the impression that aims and instruments 
in this field of political action show a diminishing difference between 
East and West. This impression holds true if one tries to identify some 
of the common characteristics of family policy, such as: 
1 The present predominance of an active demographic policy. 
2 The aim to support the family system mainly in the field of child care 
and especially during the first years of the life ofxhildren. 
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3 The development of a differentiated policy according to the 
life-cycle of the family, with special attention to the young family. 
4 The expansion of services for the out-of-family care of children. 
5 The introduction of counselling and therapeutic services for spouses 
and parents and the decentralisation of such services. 
6 The introduction and improvement of different forms of 
anticipatory education for marriage and parenthood. 
7 The combination of economic with educative, counselling and 
therapeutic instruments, and the attention to the micro- and 
meso-system variables, which influence the quality of education in 
the family. 
Besides these common traits of strategies of family policy in East 
and West, there remain, however, clear differences. One decisive 
difference has already been mentioned, namely, the role of the 
political administration and the Party at all levels - A l l - U n i o n , 
republic, regional and local - and in all dimensions of family policy, 
including services for children and families. Whereas in Western 
countries we have a tradition of non-state activity and private initiative 
and responsibility mainly in the areas of child care and counselling 
services, the Soviet tradition of state activity and Party control has 
remained unbroken. In spite of the facts that decentralisation is 
furthered and that the needs of the people to find self-realisation, not 
in the work sphere and society at large but rather in the micro- and 
meso-milieu of family and community, is supported by different 
measures, there is no example of any activity in the area of family 
policy where support systems work outside the formal system. One 
gets the impression that it is just because the family ranks so highly in 
the value hierarchy of people that the political system is anxious, by 
supporting the realisation of this value, not to lose control over 
people's loyalty. 
Let me conclude with some more general remarks. We are used to 
perceiving modern society as one in rapid change. Indeed, the 
transformation of conditions is a continuing process, influenced by 
what is called the scientific-technical revolution. On the other hand, 
the solutions to all those human problems that have developed as 
by-products of socio-economic change seem to be traditional ones, 
seem to display continuity with, or even the tendency to return to, old 
values. One example of this phenomenon is the old-new priority, 
which the family, as social group and socialising agent, has assumed in 
the context of socio-economic and educational policy and planning. 
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This is true not only for the Soviet Union but also for many societies in 
the East and West. I have the impression, however, that for the Soviet 
society this reorientation towards the family is of special importance. 
The Soviet model of planned socio-economic change is characterised 
by an extremely high degree of centralisation, bureaucratisation and 
control, which is obviously unable to motivate private initiative and 
creative solutions. In this context the family, as the only social setting 
in which self-determination is relevant, becomes especially important, 
not only for individual self-realisation but also for the functioning of 
society at large. It is interesting to note that, under these conditions, 
the family itself did not and does not undergo much social change. It is 
the traditional nuclear family group, with a high degree of sex-role 
differentiation and parent-child hierarchy, which is prominent and 
which is supported by public policies. The socialist dreams of new 
life-styles, of collective life and of collective education, once 
experimented with during the 1920s, have turned into a reality in which 
a bourgeois type of nuclear family has become the stronghold of 
personal and social identity, easing, as it does, the growing experiences 
of alienation in society at large. Present family policy is, so to speak, a 
reaction to this situation of the marginal man. 

